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EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Are All of the Act's Requirements
for Attorney Fee Applications
Jurisdictional in Nature?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 245-247. © 2004 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Is an award of fees under Section
2412(d) of the Equal Access to
Justice Act barred solely because
the applicant's timely filed fee appli-
cation did not initially allege that
the position of the U.S. government
in the underlying litigation lacked
substantial justification?
FACTS
After prevailing in litigation against
the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs regarding his claim for dis-
ability benefits, Randall
Scarborough submitted an applica-
tion to the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims under
the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) in October 1999, stating
that: (1) he had prevailed in the liti-
gation; (2) his net worth did not
exceed the $2 million limit for filing
under the EAJA; (3) his attorney
had represented him in the matter;
and (4) his attorney had incurred
fees and expenses during this repre-
sentation that were enumerated in
an attachment to the application.
On December 3, 1999, the govern-
ment filed a motion to dismiss the
EAJA application for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The government
claimed that Scarborough had failed
to satisfy the jurisdictional require-
ments under the EAJA because he
had not alleged in his application
that the government's position in the
underlying litigation lacked substan-
tial justification. Scarborough then
filed an amendment to his EAJA
application on December 9, 1999,
alleging that the government's posi-
tion lacked substantial justification.
Examining the EAJA, the Veterans
Claims court held that each of the
required parts of an EAJA fee appli-
cation is a jurisdictional require-
ment that must be met within the
30-day filing period, including the
requirement that the applicant
allege that the government's posi-
tion is "'not substantially justified."
The Veterans Claims court then dis-
missed Scarborough's EAJA applica-
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tion for lack of subject matter juris-
diction based on his failure to satis-
fy this latter requirement.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal. 273 F.3d 1087 (Fed. Cir.
2001). Scarborough petitioned the
Supreme Court for review. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion, and returned the case to the
Federal Circuit for reconsideration
in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Edelman v. Lynchburg
College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002).
After additional briefing from the
parties, the Federal Circuit once
again affirmed the decision of the
Veterans Claims court dismissing
the application. 319 F.3d 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit
explained that the plain language of
the EAJA requires not only that an
application be filed by the 30-day
deadline, but that it contain aver-
ments addressing each of the four
other requirements enumerated in
the statute. Although it noted that
the EAJA neither mandates strict
compliance nor forecloses supple-
mentation when the details of the
stated jurisdictional averments
remain to be "fleshed out" or cor-
rected, the Federal Circuit ruled
that when the application complete-
ly fails to address one of the four
statutory requirements by the 30-
day deadline, more than a "fleshing
out of the details" remains and the
application will be deemed jurisdic-
tionally defective.
Scarborough then petitioned the
Supreme Court for review of this
latest decision of the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court granted
Scarborough's petition for certiorari.
124 S.Ct. 45 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The EAJA makes the United States
liable for attorney fees for which it
would not otherwise be liable.
The statute provides that a party
seeking an award of attorney fees
against the United States:
shall, within thirty days of
final judgment in the action,
submit to the court an applica-
tion for fees and other expens-
es which shows that the party
is a prevailing party and is eli-
gible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the
amount sought, including an
itemized statement from any
attorney .... stating the actual
time expended and the rate at
which fees and other expenses
were computed. The party
shall also allege that the posi-
tion of the United States was
not substantially justified.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
In Edelman v. Lynehburg College,
the case the Supreme Court direct-
ed the Federal Circuit to consider,
Edelman was denied tenure at
Lynchburg College. Edelman filed a
timely charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging gender-based
discrimination, exacerbated by dis-
crimination on the basis of national
origin and religion in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Although Edelman's charge
initially did not include an oath or
affirmation as required by Title VII,
he supplemented his original sub-
mission by filing a verified form
approximately two weeks after the
deadline. The district court dis-
missed the case, concluding that the
late-filed verified form could not
relate back to and provide Edelman
with a timely filing date. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that Title
VII required the charge to be veri-
fied within the specified time peri-
od. The Supreme Court disagreed
and reversed.
According to the Supreme Court,
the purposes behind the verification
requirement and the timeliness
requirement are quite different.
While the timeliness requirement
encourages prompt filing of claims
and speedy resolution of discrimina-
tory behavior, the verification
requirement is intended to protect
employers from frivolous claims.
It is Scarborough's position that the
EAJA's 30-day time limit is not juris-
dictional, but is a statute of limita-
tions subject to various equitable
doctrines such as "relation back"
and tolling, under which his fee
application should have been con-
sidered timely and complete. Even
if the 30-day time limit is an
absolute bar to an untimely fee
application, Scarborough says it
does not bar timely, but incomplete,
fee applications that are promptly
amended to supply missing informa-
tion or allegations.
Scarborough argues that his amend-
ment of the application to allege
that the government's position was
not substantially justified relates
back to his timely filed fee applica-
tion under both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Edelman.
Additionally, Scarborough claims
that the 30-day period should have
been equitably tolled because he
actively pursued his judicial reme-
dies by filing a pleading during the
statutory period, and because the
government's failure to respond to
his fee application as required by
the applicable Veterans Claims
court rule induced him into allowing
the filing deadline to pass.
Even if the 30-day time limit is an
absolute bar to consideration of an
untimely fee application,
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Scarborough contends it is not a
jurisdictional bar to a timely (but
incomplete) application.
Scarborough says the Federal
Circuit's decision is at odds with the
Supreme Court's decision in Becker
v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757
(2001). The Court in that case held
that an amendment supplying a
missing signature to a timely filed
notice of appeal must be allowed,
even if the time to appeal has
expired, so long as the amendment
is filed promptly after the defect is
brought to the appellant's attention.
Scarborough also disagrees with the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of
the EAJA, pointing out that, unlike
the other three application require-
ments, the sentence concerning the
"no substantial justification"
requirement does not contain any
limitations period at all.
According to Principi, however, the
30-day deadline is jurisdictional and
is not subject to equitable exten-
sion. He argues that the EAJA
requirements are conditions on a
waiver of sovereignty and must be
strictly construed. Principi also
claims that the relation-back rule
suggested by Scarborough is not
supported by the text of the EAJA
or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Principi says that this case is distin-
guishable from Edelman, asserting
that Edelman involved the applica-
tion of an agency regulation to pri-
vate litigation rather than a waiver
of sovereign immunity. In addition,
Principi notes that Title VII is a
remedial scheme in which lay-
persons rather than lawyers are
expected to initiate the process. He
argues that whereas Edelman's per-
missive "relation back" of the verifi-
cation requirement ensures that lay
complainants will not forfeit their
rights inadvertently, the EAJA is
directed to attorneys seeking attor-
ney fees. Accordingly, Principi
declares that the protection of
Edelman is not required under the
EAJA. In addition, Principi contends
that, unlike the verification require-
ment of Edelman, the required alle-
gation that the government was "not
substantially justified" is not simply
a tool to weed out frivolous claims,
but rather is a portion of the basis
of the attorney fee award itself.
With respect to the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of the EAJA, Principi
points out that the sentence requir-
ing an allegation that the govern-
ment's position lacked substantial
justification immediately follows,
and refers back to, the sentence
containing the 30-day deadline and
other content requirements for a fee
application.
SIGNIFICANCE
The question of whether the indi-
vidual requirements of the EAJA are
jurisdictional and must be satisfied
within the 30-day period has been
addressed by other circuit courts in
addition to the Federal Circuit. In
Dunn v. United States, 775 F.2d 99
(3d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit
held that a failure to itemize the
amount sought under the EAJA
could be corrected after the 30-day
time limit if no prejudice to the
government would arise. In effect,
the Third Circuit divided the EAJA
into two distinct components-a
filing deadline and a standard for
pleading.
The Eleventh Circuit in Singleton v.
Apfel, 231 F.3d 853 (11th Cir.
2000), adopted the reasoning of the
Third Circuit in Dunn and found
that an EAJA application may be
supplemented after the 30-day time
limit to satisfy both the requirement
regarding net worth and the require-
ment regarding the government's
position not being "substantially
justified." The Eleventh Circuit
explained that, while it appears
from the legislative history that
Congress intended the filing
requirement to be jurisdictional, it
is far from apparent that Congress
intended that strict compliance with
the pleading requirements be
accomplished within the same time
frame as filing.
In Scarborough, on the other hand,
the Federal Circuit read the plain
language of the EAJA to require not
only that an application be filed by
the 30-day deadline, but that it con-
tain averments addressing each of
the four other requirements enu-
merated in the statute.
This case presents the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to
resolve the dispute among the cir-
cuits as well as to clarify the scope
of its decision in Edelman. A deci-
sion reversing the Federal Circuit
will provide a more liberal rule,
making it somewhat easier to recov-
er attorney fees from the govern-
ment. A decision affirming the
Federal Circuit's decision will
require persons seeing attorney fees
under the EAJA to strictly comply
with the application requirements.
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